法律翻译 第4组




Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that action. E. g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718,724. Neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with equal protection when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities. To meet the burden of justification, a State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.''' Ibid., quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 150. The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 643, 648. The heightened review standard applicable to sex-based classifications does not make sex a proscribed classification, but it does mean that categorization by sex may not be used to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women. pp. 531-534.

寻求为基于性别的政府行动辩护的政党必须为这一行动提出"非常有说服力的理由"。例如,《密西西比大学女性诉霍根案》,载于《美国最高法院判例汇编》第458卷,第718724页。(Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718,724.)。如果一项法律或官方政策仅仅因为妇女是女性而拒绝给予她们充分的公民地位,根据个人的天赋和能力参与社会并为社会做出贡献时,无论是联邦政府或是州政府的行为都损害了平等保护原则。为了承担辩护责任,州政府必须表明“至少(受到质疑的)分类有助于实现`重要的政府目标,所采用的歧视性手段`与实现这些目标密切相关'。同上,引自《温格勒诉穆特药剂师有限公司》载于《美国最高法院判例汇编》第446卷(Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 150.)辩护理由必须是真实的,而不是为诉讼而事后假设或补充的。而且,它绝不能依赖于对男性和女性的不同天赋、能力或偏好的过度概括。参见《温伯格诉维森菲尔德案》,载于《美国最高法院判例汇编》第420卷,第636643648(Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 643, 648.)。适用于基于性别领域的强化审查标准并未禁止依据性别做出的分类,但它确实意味着按性别分类不可用来造成或延续女性在法律、社会和经济方面的劣势地位。第531-534页。

Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities VMI provides denies equal protection to women. Pp. 534-546.

Virginia contends that single-sex education yields important educational benefits and that provision of an option for such education fosters diversity in educational approaches. Benign justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions, however, must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded. Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities within the Commonwealth. A purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan to afford a unique educational benefit only to males. However well this plan serves Virginia's sons, it makes no provision whatever for her daughters. Pp. 535-540.



(b) Virginia also argues that VMI's adversative method of training provides educational benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to women, and that alterations to accommodate women would necessarily be so drastic as to destroy VMI's program. It is uncontested that women's admission to VMI would require accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical training programs for female cadets. It is also undisputed, however, that neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers, VMI's raison d'etre, nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women. The District Court made "findings" on "gender-based developmental differences" that restate

the opinions of Virginia's expert witnesses about typically male or typically female "tendencies." Courts, however, must take "a hard look" at generalizations or tendencies of the kind Virginia pressed, for state actors controlling gates to opportunity have no warrant to exclude qualified individuals based on "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 725. The notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other "self-fulfilling prophec[ies], see id., at 730, once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities. Women's successful entry into the federal military academies, and their participation in the Nation's military forces, indicate that Virginia's fears for VMI's future may not be solidly grounded. The Commonwealth's justification for excluding all women from "citizen-soldier" training for which some are qualified, in any event, does not rank as "exceedingly persuasive." Pp. 540-546.

(b)弗吉尼亚还认为,弗吉尼亚军事学院的对抗性培训方式无法为女性提供应有的教育效果,因此必须用另一种针对女性的方式,这种方式会摧毁弗吉尼亚军事学院的项目。毫无疑问,女性入读弗吉尼亚军事学院需做出调整,主要是为女学员安排住房的问题和体能训练计划。然而,同样毫无疑问的是,无论是培养士兵的目标,弗吉尼亚军事学院的存在理由,还是弗吉尼亚军事学院的实施方法,其本质上都并非不适合女性。地方法院对“基于性别的发展差异”做出一项“调查”,该“调查”重申了弗吉尼亚专家证人对典型男性或典型女性“倾向”的看法。但是,法院必须对弗吉尼亚州提出的这种概括性或倾向性进行“艰难的考察”,因为掌控机会之门的州行为者无权依据“关于男性和女性角色和能力的固定观念”,将合格人员排除在外。 《密西西比女子大学》:725Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 725)。接收女性入读会降低弗吉尼亚军事学院的地位,破坏其对抗性训练体系,甚至是破坏学校,这种观点是一个难以证明的判断,这一预测与其他“自我实现的预言”几乎没有差别,同上,第730页,曾被用来剥夺权利或机会。女性成功进入联邦军事学院,参加国家军队,这表明弗吉尼亚州对弗吉尼亚军事学院未来的担忧没有坚实基础。对于将所有女性排除在“公民士兵”培训项目之外,而某些人有资格接受培训这个问题,该州的辩护在任何情况下都不算是有说服力。第540-546页。

3. The remedy proffered by Virginia-maintain VMI as a male-only college and create VWIL as a separate program for women-does not cure the constitutional violation. Pp. 546-558.

(a) A remedial decree must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of discrimination. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280. The constitutional violation in this case is the categorical exclusion of women, in disregard of their individual merit, from an extraordinary educational opportunity afforded men. Virginia chose to leave untouched VMI's exclusionary policy, and proposed for women only a separate program, different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities. VWIL affords women no opportunity to experience the rigorous military training for which VMI is famed. Kept away from the pressures, hazards, and psychological bonding characteristic of VMI's adversative training, VWIL students will not know the feeling of tremendous accomplishment commonly experienced by VMI's successful cadets. Virginia maintains that methodological differences are justified by the important differences between men and women in learning and developmental needs, but generalizations about "the way women are," estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description. In myriad respects other than military training, VWIL does not qualify as VMI's equal. The VWIL program is a pale shadow of VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence. Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities the Commonwealth supports at VWIL and VMI. Cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. Pp. 547-554.

3.弗吉尼亚州所提出的补救措施——将保留弗吉尼亚军事学院为一所单一男性学院,并创建弗吉尼亚女性领导力学院(VWIL)作为一个单独的女性项目——但这并不能解决违宪问题。第546 - 558页。

(a)一项补救法令必须要适用于违反宪法的现象它必须被塑造成使被剥夺机会或优势的人们能够在不受歧视的情况下处于他们本应达到的位置。参见《米利肯诉布拉德利案》(433)267280章。在本案中,违反宪法体现在无视女性的个体优势,将女性排除在男性独享的教育机会之外。弗吉尼亚州选择不触及弗吉尼亚军事学院的排外政策,只为女性提出了一个单独的计划,不仅与弗吉尼亚军事学院在性质上不同,在有形和无形的设施上也不平等。吉尼亚女性领导力学院没有为女性提供体验弗吉尼亚军事学院赖以闻名的严格军事训练的机会吉尼亚女性领导力学院的学会因为没有受到弗吉尼亚军事学院逆境训练的压力、困难情感纽带特征,而感受不到到弗吉尼亚军事学院成功学员通常会产生的巨大成就感。弗吉尼亚州坚持认为,男女在学习和发展需求方面的重要差异证明了方法论差异的合理性,但对“女性的方式”的概括,对大多数女性的适合程度的估计,不能作为评判的标杆去剥夺那些能力超出平均水平的女性的机会。在军事训练以外的许多方面,吉尼亚女性领导力学院都不符合弗吉尼亚军事学院的要求。吉尼亚女性领导力学院项目在课程选择范围、教师地位、资金、声望、校友支持和影响力等方面无法企及弗吉尼亚军事学院。弗吉尼亚州在联邦政府支持的吉尼亚女性领导力学院和弗吉尼亚军事学院的独立教育机会方面没有表现出实质性的平等。参照斯维特诉画家》(Sweatt v. Painter339 U. S. 629.。第547 - 554页。

(b)第四巡回法院并未问询拟议补救措施是否能使被剥夺享有弗吉尼亚军事学院优势的女性在没有歧视的情况下获得她们本应达到的位置,(《米利肯》:280Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280))而是考虑联邦是否可以忠于平等保护,为男女提供分开的不平等的教育项目。上诉法院在宣布实质不同且明显不平等的吉尼亚女性领导力学院程序令人满意时,上诉法院以标准取代了本法院制定的严格标准,并增加了对其发明的调查,即“实质可比性”测试。第四巡回法庭在弗吉尼亚州的吉尼亚女性领导力学院项目进行分析时显然犯了错误,因为“如今所有基于性别的分类”都需要“中等严格审查标准”。参见J. E. B 诉阿拉巴马州》(J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136。弗吉尼亚州有给予她们真正的平等和保护义务,基于此,寻求和适合弗吉尼亚军事学院优质教育的女性应该完整接受这种教育。第554-558页。

(b) The Fourth Circuit failed to inquire whether the proposed remedy placed women denied the VMI advantage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of discrimination, Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, and considered instead whether the Commonwealth could provide, with fidelity to equal protection, separate and unequal educational programs for men and women. In declaring the substantially different and significantly unequal VWIL program satisfactory, the appeals court displaced the exacting standard developed by this Court with a standard, and added an inquiry of its own invention, the "substantive comparability" test. The Fourth Circuit plainly erred in exposing

Virginia's VWIL plan to such an analysis, for "all gender-based classifications today" warrant "heightened scrutiny." See J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136. Women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be offered anything less, under the Commonwealth's obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection. Pp. 554-558.

No. 94-2107, 976 F.2d 890, affirmed; No.

94-1941,44 F.3d 1229, reversed and


GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 558. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 566. THOMAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Paul Bender, Washington, DC, for U.S.

Theodore B. Olson, Washington, DC, for

Virginia, et al.

94-2107, 976 F.2d 890号,确认判决;第 94-1941,44 F.3d 1229,号,撤销判决并发回重审。

金斯伯格(GINSBURG, J.)法官提出了法院的意见,其中包括史蒂文斯(STEVENS),奥康纳(O'CONNOR),肯尼迪(KENNEDY),苏特(SOUTER)和布雷耶(BREYER)等法官的意见。伦奎斯特(REHNQUIST)大法官呈递了协同意见,(558页)。斯卡利亚(SCALIA)法官提出了不同意见(第566页)。托马斯(THOMAS)法官不参与本案的考虑或决定。


保罗·本德(Paul Bender),美国华盛顿特区,代表合众国。

西奥多·奥尔森(Theodore B.Olson),华盛顿特区,代表弗吉尼亚州等