No.4 is left out until the last paragraph on page 5.
“The withdrawal of the Burma Area Army Headquarters from Rangoon to Moulmein commenced at the end of April 1945, the complete concentration being effected at the beginning of July. The headquarters, however, could not function as it should; its hasty retreat to Moulmein, the loss of communication and transportation equipment and the important documents, the transference of many skilled staff-officers, the unsatisfactory replacements among the administrative personnel, frequent air raids by British-Indian planes and the fact that it was at the peak of the rainy season--all these factors interfered with the satisfactory functioning of the Army headquarters. Above all, the air raids by the British-Indian planes which were conducted in the daytime and on moonlight nights as well, frequently compelled the headquarters to seek shelter in the outlying villages of Moulmein and attend to its duties there. And most of the soldiers, too, not to speak of the invalids, had to seek shelter in the jungles both day and night.
“At the end of March 1945, with the state of things prevailing so unfavorably, the national defense army of Burma, numbering 6,000-8,000 rose against the Japanese and the guerrillas started a campaign of harassing our rear lines and we were greatly menaced.
“The Burma National Defense Army had seemed favorable to the Japanese, as an agreement was arranged at Rangoon with the Japanese Army for united operations. The revolt was an unexpected one for the Japanese. Afterwards, it became clear that a secret declaration of war against Japan had been made and signed by Major General Aung san on 14 March 1945.For this purpose they had previously stationed numbers of men in the rear of the Japanese Army, at the key strategic points, such as Toungoo, Pegu, and Thaton. The main body in Henzada, with the outbreak of the uprising, destroyed the means of communication and transportation at several places, assaulted the sentry-guards, squads of soldiers and gendarmerie squads at various places, murdering most of these officers and seizing the money and stores kept in their custody. Espionage was engaged in by the guerrillas so that the Headquarters of the Burma Area Army and the 28th and the 33rd Corps headquarters were subjected to serious bombings with heavy losses to us, and the Japanese officers in charge of the national defense militia were for the most part killed. Of the 200-odd Japanese nationals, including the interpreters and the commercial clerks who were in the Delta region, only a few were found safe at the end of the war and the rest are still missing.
“However, General KIMURA sought no revenge. On the contrary, he stressed the importance of the friendship hitherto kept up between Japan and Burma and met the situation from a strategical point of view only. There were left no forces to meet the emergency. A small amount of troops and part of the 55th division which had been dispatched for aid in the quarter of Bassein and Meiktila were used for the purpose of making a false show of strength.
“From January 1945 there began to be formed one after another guerrilla parties of Karen and Kachin tribes in the mountain regions south of Kemapew and Kaukareik area and in the regions south of Papun. What with the entry of the Indian educated Burmese, the arrival of Indians and British officers by means of parachutes and the replenishment by air of arms and munitions, the guerrillas grew rapidly to strength till the groups were scattered far and wide, working most actively in collusion with the rebels."
Skip now to the beginning of the fourth line, the bottom of the page:
“In a nameless village on the western bank of the river,40 or 50 kilometers to the northwest of Swe-gyin, ten Japanese Red Cross were assaulted and not one of them came back alive (this, according to the report of the soldier who was with the victims at the time of the incident). For all of these cases of resistance on the part of the Burmese, General KIMURA always warned his troops against taking retaliatory measures.
“Such being the case while General KIMURA was commanding, there was no chance whatever for us to take British-Indian troops as prisoners. Thus the situation of the Burma Area Army for the few months before the end of the war was a succession of defeats. In consequence of the defeats and the subsequent decline in the army's fighting strength, our men were demoralized; they were both physically and morally in a state of exhaustion. The Japanese troops who were scattered in small groups all over the operations areas were overpowered by a sense of defeat, and had their minds occupied only with the question of how to defend themselves against the Burmese rebel army and the guerrillas.
“The harassing activities that these hostile groups were carrying on in the rear of our army, the loss and destruction of the means of communication, the lack of fresh supplies of dry cell batteries, traffic disturbances caused by British planes, the interruption of communications during the highest rainy season--all these factors combined to all but paralyze the entire working system of the Burma Area Army, thus rendering it very difficult for the officers to lead and supervise their men properly. As the Burma Area Army Headquarters had been scheduled to break up before the end of August 1945, the retrenchment, reorganization and transference of the Army was planned, part of which was actually being executed. Meanwhile, most of the Army Staff officers had been transferred; therefore we were obliged to make-shift with non-career staff officers for the time being. Naturally, the Army Headquarters which was busily engaged in making preparations to meet the intended attacks by the Allied armies by land and sea in the near future experienced much difficulty and inconvenience in attending to their business. It was while we were laboring under these difficulties that the war was ended. Unfavorably circumstanced as he was, Commander KIMURA had been endeavoring all this while to maintain and improve the discipline of his troops and also to win and keep up the trust of the populace.
“Not one single instance of unlawful conduct allegedly committed by his men was ever reported to the Army Headquarters. I am certain that no orders were ever issued by KIMURA for the perpetration of the atrocious acts, evidence of which has been brought before the court. Such acts would not have been tolerated. As for the Kalagon village affair, the British Army Headquarters, several months after the close of the war, questioned General KIMURA about it; the general and I and the other staff officers as well had not known anything about it. It was in March 1946,if I remember right, that I heard about the affair for the first time.”